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1. Introduction
A century after Veblen’s famous article complaining about the lack of
evolutionary foundations of the economics discipline (Veblen, [1898]) the notion
of evolution features as a central concept in several current analytical
perspectives, although with different interpretations and uses. Sometimes it is
barely distinguishable from the very notion of dynamics itself, cum some non-
linearities and phase transitions.   Elsewhere, it takes a meaning much nearer to
that in biological theories involving selection, inheritance and variation. In yet
other perspectives, it borrows only part of the biological view, significantly
modified to suit the distinctive features of socio-economic processes.
It would be a futile exercise to try to review here what is actually meant by
evolution in these different theories. Rather, in the following, we shall, first,
sketch out what we consider to be the main results achieved so far by a few
different approaches that invoke, one way or another, evolutionary explanations
of economic phenomena, and second, map some overlaps and some differences
among them that hint, in our view, at some major unresolved issues ahead.
More specifically, we shall concisely consider (a) models and empirical studies
broadly in a post-Schumpeterian perspective of the genre often ascribed to Nelson
and Winter [1982]; (b) e volutionary game  theories; (c) o rganizational ecology
approaches; (d) artificial economies; and (e) part of that expanding literature on
adaptive learning which is based on some evolutionary argument.3
To set some sort of benchmark for the discussion below, let us start from
what we deem to be a ‘maximalist’ vision of an evolutionary research
programme.
2. Evolutionary theories: some building blocks 1
For the purposes of this work, let us confine ourselves to some basic
features of evolutionary theories of  economic change. First, notwithstanding
possible differences in other more substantive  hypotheses, evolutionary theories
share the methodological imperative “dynamics first !”.  That is, the explanation
for why something exists, or why a variable takes the value it does, ought to rest
on a process account of how it became what it is. Loosely speaking, that amounts
to the  theoretical imperative: provide the process story either by formally
writing down some dynamical system, or telling a good qualitative historical
reconstruction (or, much better  both).  Or, putting it in terms of negative
prescriptions: be extremely wary of any interpretation of what is observed that
runs just in terms of ex-post equilibrium rationalizations (“it has to be like that,
given rationality”).  Never take as a good ‘explanation’ either an existence
theorem or a purely functionalist claim (entity  x exists because it performs
function  y....).  [Note, in this perspective that, Milton Friedman’s old “as...if”
                                                
1 This section draws upon Coriat and Dosi [1998a]. More detailed discussion in germane perspectives are in
Hodgson [1993], Dosi and Nelson [1994], Nelson [1995], Silverberg [1988], Silverberg and Verspagen
[1995], Metcalfe [1992], Anderson [1988], Witt [1993], Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo [1996], Lesourne
[1991] and Lesourne and Orlean [1998].4
interpretation of the properties of equilibrium behaviors (Friedman [1953])
should be taken as a (daring!) conjecture on the limit properties of some
unspecified dynamics; and so should be notions such as that of evolutionary
stable strategies (ESS) as originally put forward in biology by John Maynard
Smith (1982), although the dynamical intuitions are more understandable in the
latter case.].
Given this general epistemological prescription (admittedly not an
obvious one or even generally accepted amongst economists), the following
substantive building blocks give shape to a full-fledged evolutionary research
programme.
1. Theories ought to be  micro-founded, in the sense that they ought to be
grounded explicitly (though perhaps indirectly) in a plausible account of what
typical agents do and why they do it. 2
2. Realism is a virtue and in certain respects a necessity.  Although theories
are necessarily abstract and admit less of reality than they omit, there are some
broad features of reality that the are omitted at the theorist’s peril – in the sense
that the conclusions are unreliable guides to the interpretation of reality, though
perhaps instructive  regarding important mechanisms or otherwise useful.
3. Among these features is the fact that Agents have at best  imperfect
understanding of the environment they live in, and, even more so, of what the
                                                
2 Note, however, that quite a few ‘aggregate’ (i.e. non-microfounded) dynamic models are nonetheless
consistent with an evolutionary interpretation (some of them are surveyed in Silverberg and Verspagen
[1995] and in Coriat and Dosi [1995]; see also the survey in a different prespective, by Boldrin [1988]).5
future will deliver. Hence, “bounded rationality” is generally assumed, with its
specific content varying with context.
4. Also, imperfect understanding and imperfect, path-dependent, learning
entails persistent  heterogeneity among agents, even when facing identical
information and identical notional opportunities.  Capturing heterogeneity is
crucial to the representation of aggregate dynamics; a model without
heterogeneity is like a  flower garden without color.
5. The knowledge margin is always active: agents are always capable of
discovering new technologies and ways of organizing, and adopting new
behavioral patterns.  Allowing for the immanent possibility of  novelty in the system
is a major theoretical and modeling challenge that cannot safely be ignored.
6. While (imperfect) adaptation and discovery generate variety (often in a
seemingly random fashion), collective interactions within and outside markets
operate as selection mechanisms, generating differential growth (and possibly also
survival) of different entities that are the ‘carriers’ of diverse technologies,
routines, strategies, etc.
7. As a result of all this, aggregate phenomena (e.g. regularities in the
growth process or in industrial structures, etc.) are often captured  theoretically
as emergent properties --. the collective and largely unintentional outcome of far-
from-equilibrium micro interactions and heterogeneous learning.  Such properties
often have a meta-stable nature, in the sense that while persisting on a time scale6
longer than the processes generating them, they disappear ultimately with
probability one. 3
8. A similar style of representation and interpretation should apply to the
emergence and self-maintenance of organizational forms and institutions: they are
partly the result of directed (purposeful) action by the agents but also, partly, the
unintentional outcome of  the interplay of agent learning and collective
interactions.
9.  The relation of the “higher level” regularities manifested in institutions,
rules and organizational forms to “lower level” evolutionary processes is a
complex one of co-evolution across levels of analysis and time scales -- and ought
properly to be modeled as such.. While the former are emergent phenomena of
the latter, they may be considered as relatively invariant structures which
constrain and shape  the latter on short time scales.  Modeling approaches that
take these higher level quasi-invariants as given have the same provisional
legitimacy granted more generally to models that exclude, in the  imperative
spirit of dividing the difficulties, significant forms of novelty.
This is the grand programme, as we see it.  It is obviously impossible to
review here the rapidly- growing literature of contributions that share some or
                                                
3 On the notions of the “emergence” and “metastability”, cf. the suggestive discussion in Lane [1993]; see
also below.7
all of the foregoing theoretical ‘building blocks’.4   We review here some of the
major lines of research, achievements and distinctive features.
3. Evolutionary lines of research and main results:  a brief overview.
Above we called one of the evolutionary-inspired research perspectives
“post-Schumpeterian”, lacking a better word.  In the following we shall refer to
it, with some imperialism, , as “evolutionary theories of economic change”
(ETEC), borrowing from the title of Nelson and Winter.  ETEC do indeed share
most of the foregoing ‘building blocks’, and on that ground aim at the
interpretation of economic phenomena at different levels of aggregation -
including industrial dynamics and macroeconomic growth.
For the sake of illustration, consider, in a nutshell, the ETEC story on the
economic growth process.  The story crucially involves a multitude of
(heterogeneous) firms searching for more efficient techniques of production and
better performing products, and competing in the markets for products, inputs
and finance. Differential success in search, together with different behavioral and
strategies (concerning e.g. pricing, investment, etc.) determine their differential
revealed performances (in terms of e.g. their profitability, market shares, and
survival probabilities) and hence their ability to grow.  Aggregate growth, in this
view, is - in a first approximation - driven by (partly endogenous and
                                                
4 Note that, given the above broad definition of an ‘evolutionary research programme’, it may well partly
cover also contributions of authors who could not call themselves ‘evolutionist’ in any strict sense.8
idiosyncratic) technological advances. Thus, the eye of the analyst is naturally
drawn to the origins, nature and accessibility of technological opportunities; the
ease with which firms can imitate each other (affecting  diffusion and
appropriability conditions); the ways firms are able to store and augment their
knowledge (i.e. affecting  organizational routines  and their relationship to
competences); and the mechanisms and speed of market selection.  Finally note that
such an evolutionary programme demands a complementary explanation of the
key features of the environment faced by firms and individuals, especially
the technological opportunities tapped by private agents; the legal framework
shaping appropriability conditions; the origins of particular sets of corporate
routines; the nature of product market interactions among rivals; the ways wages
react to the changes in the demand for labor induced by technical change and
growth; etc.  In all of  these respects, economic institutions play a key role:
consider respectively university and government labs, patent laws and courts,
trade associations and business schools, antitrust and regulatory authorities,
labor laws and unions.  It must be admitted, however, that the detailed
exploration of these linkages has barely begun; for a discussion of the
relationship between institutions and evolutionary processes, see Coriat and
Dosi [1998a]).
There is indeed a flourishing family of formal models and historical
interpretations constructed along these lines, construing economic growth as an
evolutionary process propelled by technical change.  After Nelson and Winter9
[1982], see among others Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg and Soete [1988],
Day and Eliasson [1986], Silverberg and Verspagen [1994], Conlisk [1989],
Chiaromonte and Dosi [1993], Silverberg and Soete [1993], Fagerberg [1994], and
the discussion in Nelson [1995] and Silverberg and Verspagen [1995].
Relatedly, the diffusion of innovation has been analysed, from different
angles, as  a process highlighting at least some of the evolutionary, path-
dependent, features outlined above (cf. among others David [1985] and [1992];
Silverberg et al [1988]; Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski [1987]; Nakicenovic and
Grübler [1992]; Metcalfe [1992] and [1995]).
The development of an evolutionary perspective has been deeply
intertwined with the historical analysis of the processes by which technical
change is generated, ranging from the microeconomic level all the way to
‘national systems of innovation’(within an enormous literature, see Freeman
[1982]; Dosi [1982]; David [1975], Rosemberg [1976] and [1982]; Basalla [1988];
Mokyr [1990]; Grandstrand [1994]; Vincenti [1990], Nelson [1993]; Lundvall
[1992] and the reviews in Dosi [1988] and Freeman [1994]).
Finally, a growing number of industrial case studies and models of
industrial change fits quite well the evolutionary conjectures outlined above
(again, just as examples, see Pavitt [1984]; Utterback and Suarez [1992]; Klepper
[1993]; Malerba and Orsenigo [1994]; Winter [1984]; Dosi et al. [1995]).10
The properties of industrial dynamics have been addressed also from a
partly overlapping perspective, namely  the ecology of organizational populations
(EOP), a literature stream based in sociology that has emphasized the processes
of entry, social legitimization and mortality as drivers of industrial evolution,
operating on changing populations of heterogeneous firms characterized by
highly inertial organizational and behavioral traits (Hannan and Freeman [1989],
Hannan and Carroll [1997], Carroll [1997]).
Notwithstanding the great variety in the objects of analysis, styles and
hypotheses, it is still fair to say that most of the foregoing contributions share a
distinct “phenomenological” flavour.  They typically identify the empirical
phenomena to be interpreted and then proceed with that task by telling a micro-
founded dynamic story, wherein the assumptions on the microentities
(principally the structures and behaviors of firms) and on their interactions draw
a lot from empirical generalizations or reasonable conjectures specific to the
problem at hand.  So, for example, most of the ETEC and EOP works entail
“boundedly rational” agents; but, given that, the specification of what agents
actually do - whether they are characterized by behavioral routines, and, if so
which ones; etc. - is highly context dependent, and often behaviorally quite rich
(for example, the Nelson-Winter model(s) specify rules for technological search,
investment, pricing, etc.). We shall come back below to some problems involved
in this style of analysis.11
A related but  contrasting methodology inspires work in so-called Artificial
Economies (AE) (Axtell and Epstein [1996] is an archetypical example) and is
common to the broader class of Artificial Worlds (AW) models. In an insightful
discussion, Lane characterizes such models as follows:
 “Artificial worlds.....are computer-implementable stochastic
models, which consist of a set of ‘microlevel entities’ that interact with
each other and an ‘environment’ in prescribed ways. The aim of AW
modelling is to discover whether (and under what conditions) histories
[i.e. sample paths under well specified interaction rules and initial
conditions] exhibit interesting emergent properties. An emergent property
is a feature of a history that (1) can be described in terms of aggregate-
level constructs, without reference to the attributes of specific
microentities; (2) persists for time periods much greater than the time
scale appropriate for describing the underlying micro-interactions; and
(3) defies explanation by reduction to the superposition of ‘built in’
micro-properties of the AW”. (Lane [1993] pp. 90-91).
Lane (1993) reviews some examples from different disciplines, including
Walter Fontana’s Function-Object Gas (Fontana [1992]) from chemistry  5,
Christian Lindgren’s Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (Lindgren [1992]) and a
would be Chiaromonte Dosi-Lane-Lippi-Pelkey-Tayler model of economic
dynamics, of which a preliminary version was developed in the early 90’s at the
Santa Fe Institute.
These and others models -- building upon Kauffman’s models of evolution
and self organization: cf. Kauffman [1993]; Kauffman and MacReady [1995];12
Levinthal [1997]; Frenken et al. [1999]; Westhoff et al. [1996] -- ambitiously begin
to explore some possible  generic conditions under which aggregate statistical
regularities, or organized structures emerge, most often under far-from-
equilibrium conditions.6
In the simplest cases, these regularities concern emerging patterns of
behaviors and/or location in some spatial dimension (cf. Axtell and Epstein
[1996], and for a presentation of some results in a language familiar to
economists, Krugman [1996]), in others, they refer to properties of stylized
ecologies or organizational forms (Kauffman [1993], Frenken et al. [1999],
Levinthal [1997]). In terms of the ‘grand’ evolutionary research programme
outlined earlier, the AE perspective emphasizes -- and indeed has contributed
path-breaking insights into -- the notion of emergence in complex evolving
systems. Moreover, it builds upon appropriate evolutionary microfoundations in
that agents have, at best, a “local” knowledge of the environment in which they
operate, and endogenously learn, or at least adjust, in ways possibly marked by
systematic mistakes (from a hypothetical observer’s standpoint).
Growing out of quite different theoretical origins, a wide class of models
of  Evolutionary Games (EG) also share the general assumption of boundedly
rational agents and a commitment to some underlying collective dynamics as a
basic explanatory process, often driven by a selection mechanism at the
                                                                                                                                                
5 Further challenging developments are presented in Fontana and Buss [1994]
6 The debt to the works of Ilya Prigogine as a fundamental source of inspiration along this line of research
ought to be more widely acknowledged: cf. , among the others, Nicolis and Prigogine [1977].13
population level.  The focal reference is Maynard Smith’s notion of an
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) - in fact a refinement of Nash equilibrium -
developed with respect to the static properties of population ecologies in biology
(Maynard Smith [1982]).  Since then, that analytical perspective has been
enriched by diverse dynamic developments which have began to explore the
limit properties of  selection/adaptation processes - both in deterministic and
stochastic settings – and trying also to reflect some abstract mutation-generating
mechanism.  For comprehensive presentations of the state-of-the-art at various
dates, together with a few key advances  -- see Hofbaner and Sigmund [1988], D.
Friedman [1991], Vega-Redondo [1996], Weibull [1995], Samuelson [1997], Young
[1998]).
Unlike the ETEC and EOP approaches, the broad Evolutionary-Game
modeling enterprise -- at least within the economic discipline -- has been largely
theory-driven, with comparatively low “phenomenological” discipline. Loosely
speaking, EG appears to be the symmetric opposite (but sometimes a useful
complement) to canonic Game Theory, at least in three respects.  First it swings
the microfoundations of strategic analysis the opposite way  from the
increasingly incredible forward-looking rationality  postulated by what one
could call the “ex-ante consistency view” of strategic interactions. Second, it tries
to tackle the multiplicity-of-equilibria issue.  This is a general unresolved
problem for the “ex-ante” rationalists, but it is particularly acute in the plausible
circumstances of repeated strategic interactions that lack any termination point14
well perceived by the agents.  In that respect, EG theorists attempt to identify
some  broadly plausible selection mechanism that picks out equilibria.  Third,
and relatedly, EG’s address the issue of the stability of particular equilibrium
concepts, in principle allowing for seemingly “irrational” micro perturbations or
“mutations”.
The foregoing bird-eye appreciation of the diverse perspectives that share
some of our evolutionary building blocks might give the (misleading) impression
of a comfortable convergence toward an increasingly coherent  weltanschauung
centered on  common evolutionary ideas.  This, however, is too optimistic a
view. A more fruitful dialogue among the perspectives sketched above requires
facing quite a few difficult and controversial issues concerning the basic nature
of evolutionary dynamics in  the socio-economic domain.
Let us briefly flag some of them.
4. Some open questions on structures, learning, games and other
interaction patterns 7
Small worlds vs. open-ended dynamics.  Evolutionary processes, in biology as
well as in the social domain, clearly involve the emergence of novelty of various
kinds along the evolutionary path. Although novelties are  constrained to some
extent by past history, there is still leave ample room for unexpected emergent
                                                
7 For broad discussions along similar lines, cf. Winter [1988 ], Dosi and Nelson [1994], Nelson [1995],
Metcalfe [1992], Coriat and Dosi [1998a], Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo [1995], Tordjman [1998].15
phenomena and surprises. But capturing this in models presents tricky modeling
challenges.
We believe that a full-fledged evolutionary dynamics would most likely
entail an endogenous explosion of the dimensionality of the state space explored
by the system.   As the complexity of functions and traits increases in biological
evolution from unicellular entities to mammals, so it happens also in the socio-
economic arena.
One possible modeling strategy is to allow for a notionally infinite-
dimensional space of search  8, without being able to fully specify the “law of
motion” over that space, except locally.  But what might be the analytical
objectives in studying such a system? Clearly, there is by intended construction
hardly any hope of finding some particular limit state where the system might
end up –- such a result would spell the failure of the attempt to capture the
persistent emergence of novelty.   Under such open-ended dynamics, one might
aim at best to find some emergent regularities in the process itself, concerning
e.g. the properties of emerging, metastable structures, the temporal patterns of
events - such as the “punctuation” of (quasi) equilibria and major structural
discontinuities 9 -, average dynamic properties such as rates of growth of some
variables, etc. This is indeed the philosophy of a good deal of AE’s and is shared
by a few ETEC models.
                                                
8 Or, for computer-implementable models, finite for obvious technical reasons, but with a dimensionality
high enough to practically simulate the absence of dimensionality limits.
9 E.g. Eldredge and Gould [1972]. See also Casti [1992] and the remarks in Lane [1993].16
However, EG’s  are in this respect located at the opposite extreme: they
generally assume some closed and well defined domain of exploration given
from the start, allowing a rigorous characterization of the limit states of
dynamical systems  that represent mechanisms of  adaptation and selection over
a given fitness landscape. 10.
Ultimately, the appropriateness of the theoretical representation depends
on the nature of the phenomena to be explained.  The “small
world”methodology is best suited to the interpretation of those properties of
environments where the rates of adjustment to given “fundamentals” - e.g.
technologies, organizational forms, etc. (that is to a given evolutionary
landscape), is orders of magnitude greater than the rates of change in the
fundamentals themselves (and thus in the selective environment).  Given the rate
of technological and organizational innovation in modern economies, suitable
targets would seem to be rare.
Limit vs. ‘transient’ properties.   Given an evolving system, what are the
properties one primarily wishes to study?   This issue overlaps with the previous
point.  Whenever one is pretty sure that adaptation is “fast” compared to
innovation, one may assumes that most empirical observations of the
phenomenon at hand are close-to-equilibrium outcomes of the underlying
adaptive dynamics --  hence it should be  descriptively fruitful to study the
properties of the limit states of the dynamical system in the model.  Conversely,
                                                
10 But also some ‘reduced’ forms models developed in the ETEC spirit: cf. Winter et al. [1997]17
when the foregoing condition does not apply it might be of greater interest to
study the transient (“disequilibrium”) properties of the system, recognizing that
in the reality to which the model relates, the fundamental parameters will be
shocked well before the system reaches anything approaching an equilibrium.
This indeed is what most ETEC and AE modelers do. 11
It seems to us that typical EG methodology too often subscribes cavalierly
to the former assumption.   And sometimes it does worse than that: it starts from
some equilibrium notions which have ‘nice’ properties from the point of view of
economic theory (for example because they correspond to microbehaviors that
can be supported by standard “rationality” assumptions) and then searches for
dynamical processes able to generate them.  If the point is to understand reality,
this style of intellectual production seems to us to be too roundabout.  And, at
bottom, it rests on unquestioning faith in the view that economic rationality is
the only viable approach to understanding behavior in the specific case – as
distinguished from the less doctrinaire view that the rationality assumption is
sometimes a fruitful approach.
More to the point, however, a general issue concerns what can we learn
from the characterization of the asymptotic properties of the system about its
finite-time behaviors.   In some cases, empirically interesting propositions may
                                                
11 Without, however, any religious commitments to the methodology. So, for example, the ETEC
perspective fully draws from those works on innovation diffusion where suggestive empirical implications
may be derived from the limit properties of dynamics cum heterogeneous agents and increasing returns --
cf., among others, David [1988], Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski  [1987], Bassanini and Dosi [1998]).18
be derived from the rates-of-convergence properties  12 since the latter allow to
infer, loosely speaking, how quickly the finite time (disequilibrium) observations
should be expected to converge to something resembling the limit predictions.
However, even assuming a qualitatively correct dynamic model, empirically
relevant conclusions on this point cannot be derived from purely analytical
studies of convergence; the quantitative magnitudes always matter. It is a point
in favor of simulation modeling that it offers the opportunity to explore the
quantitative convergence behavior of the model experimentally, drawing on
rough evidence or intuitions concerning parameter magnitudes.
Interaction Dynamics and Selection   A minimal requirement, common to
different genres of the evolutionary approach, and shared with a vast class of
models of decentralised economies  13, are microfoundations involving a large
number of interacting agents.  This requires the  specification of  a) the levels at
which interaction occurs (e.g. does it concerns product-market competition?
behavioral imitation? mutual technological learning? etc.); b) the mechanism of
interaction (who can do what to whom, when, and under what types of rules....);
and, possibly, c) some topology over which agents are distributed, which may
shape also the actual interaction process (for example, by making interaction
probabilities dependent upon some distance in an appropriately defined space,
etc.).  As mentioned earlier, complete evolutionary models of economic change
                                                
12 An example concerning the patterns of innovation diffusion is explored in Bassanini and Dosi   [1998];
convergence properties in stochastic EG are discussed in Vega-Redondo [ 1996].
13 See the critical surveys in Kirman and Weisbuch [1998] and Fagiolo [1998], and the references therein.19
ought to account explicitly for the joint dynamics of learning and selection.
Ideally, one should  specify the “physics” of interaction in both domains together
with the ways they are dynamically coupled.
Actual practice typically remains well short of that ideal.  In many
models, either learning or selection is bracketed - which is not necessarily a bad
intellectual strategy since it allows the exploration of the properties of single
dynamic processes, holding the rest constant.   So, for example, several models of
stochastic, decentralized, adaptive economic agents - but without explicit market
competition (cf. footnote 14) - offer very useful insights into the collective
outcomes of mutual adjustments by boundedly rational agents.   In a similar
spirit, so do various models of innovation diffusion with heterogeneous agents,
increasing returns and/or network externalities, and sequential adoptions.  14
Within a distinctly different modeling style, most AE models also focus upon the
collective properties of adaptive interactions (e.g. in the simplest cases some
rudimentary forms of local learning).  Nearer the ETEC philosophy,  Dosi and
Fagiolo [1998]  study the properties of a reduced-form evolutionary model
wherein, absent any form of market competition, the whole dynamics is driven
by decentralized activities of technological exploration, learning and imitation
over a notionally unbounded opportunity space.
At the opposite extreme, quite a few models explore the properties of
selection dynamics driven by competitive interactions in the absence of any20
explicit micro learning: cf. most EOP models. Within the ETEC perspective,
among others  Metcalfe [1992] and [1995] refines the Fisher Law, originally
developed with reference to populations in biology 15, and insightfully applies it
to industrial dynamics - while Winter et al. [1997] study generic properties of
market selection fed by the persistent arrival of technologically heterogeneous
entrants.
EG’s extensively rely upon selection dynamics of some sort.   However
many models in this perspective appear to fold together properties of population
dynamics and properties involving, at least implicitly, some form of adaptive
learning at the level of microentities: we shall come back to this shortly.
As we see it, the basic shortcoming of most current modeling of
interaction mechanisms does not concern the ceteris paribus assumptions typically
made (to repeat, a possibly healthy style of preliminary exploration).  Rather, our
concerns primarily relate to the general lack of any disciplined mapping between
the theoretical constructs on interaction processes and empirical “stylized facts”
on those very processes.
                                                                                                                                                
14 More on them in David [1992] and Bassanini and Dosi [1998]
15 In brief, the Fisher Law establishes the law of motion of average “fitness” - and, thus, of the relative
frequencies of the related traits - as a function of the higher moments of the distribution of the latter in the
appropriate fitness space.  In particular, the rate of increase of average fitness is proportional to its variance.
Setting aside some important technical qualifications, one may regard it as a typical implication of the
standard replicator dynamics common to theoretical biology, EG’s in economics and many ETEC models:
relative frequencies change with monotonic dependence upon the relative “fitness” of particular trait(s) as
compared to the overall populations averages.  Nelson and Winter [1982, pp. 240-43] establish a dynamic
analogue of the standard comparative statics result for a price change in the in the context of the Fisher Law
type of replicator dynamics.  (For a germane critical discussion of these issues, see G. Silverberg [1988].)21
Consider competitive selection dynamics. (We shall discuss learning
processes below).  Most of us have utilized on several occasions some
“blackboxed” representation of an aggregate interaction law - be it an aggregate
demand curve or a replicator dynamics of some sort.   So, for example, in Nelson
and Winter [1982] interactions in the product markets are compressed into an
unmodeled market clearing process involving a standard demand curve.   In
turn, the outcome of that collective interaction feeds back upon the growth
possibilities of each individual entity (and, thus operates as a selection
mechanism) via the gross surplus each entity is able to invest - determined by the
difference between the industry-wide price and firm-specific unit costs.
Similarly, in models such as Silversberg et al. [1988], selection is explicitly
modeled via a replicator dynamics, defining the “law of change” in market
shares as a function of the “competitiveness” of each firm as compared to the
industry average.
The point that we want to emphasize here is that it might be time to go
beyond such “blackbox” assumptions and reconstruct the collective dynamics
starting from an explicit account of the “microphysics” of market interactions 16.
This would  imply taking much more seriously the question of how markets work
17: e.g. what are the effects of the specific institutional architectures of particular
                                                
16  This indeed is a challenge that has been powerfully brought to evolutionary modeling by the AE
methodology, with its abhorrence of pre-defined “laws of motion” and its emphasis on explicit rules for
“local” interactions among micro entities; cf. also Fagiolo [1998].
17 One of the few noticeable works in this spirit is Kirman and Vignes [1991] on the  Marseille fish market.22
markets upon the ensuing collective dynamics?  How do they affect selection
processes?  In what circumstances, is something like a replicator dynamics a
good approximation of collective selection patterns? etc. A simulation
environment for financial markets designed in this spirit is presented in
Chiaromonte and Dosi [1998] and will soon be available on the Net.
A distinct, albeit overlapping, issue concerns the dimensions over which
selection occurs. In the economic arena an obviously fundamental one has to do
with  output prices, but what about the non-price dimensions of competition?18
This is another domain where evolutionary modeling can be substantially
enriched by empirical investigations into the actual determinants of
competitiveness in different industries and under different institutional settings.
More generally, as argued at greater length in Dosi and Nelson [1994] and
Tordjman [1998], analysis of selection in the social arena -- and its relationship to
some notion of “fitness” --  must confront the question of the endogeneity of the
selection criteria themselves.   As in biological evolution, what is selected is likely
to be determined in some complicated and non-linear way by the distributions of
actual populations present at a point in time and by their history.  However, in
biological systems one might reasonably hold that the selection criteria (e.g. the
reproduction abilities or the food processing efficiencies) remain relatively
invariant.   This might not be so in many socio-economic circumstances: that is,
                                                
18 Here one is primarily talking about real markets (i.e. markets for commodities and services): financial
markets are likely to embody quite different selection criteria, much more related to speculative
phenomena: more on this in Marengo and Tordjman [1996].23
not only one is likely to find “dancing” fitness landscapes, but also the
dimensions of the space over which such landscapes are defined are likely to
change, too. 19
 On the usefulness of the phenotype/genotype distinction in the social domain   A
general feature of evolutionary interpretations of change (in biology but also in
economics) is that selection ultimately operates upon a pool of ‘fundamental
traits’ of some kind, determining also their probabilities of transmission over
time.   The common biological story is known: the ‘fundamental units’ of
selection are the genes which (together with the environment) shape the
phenotypic characteristics of the individual entities upon which selection
operate; inheritance is the mechanism of transmission; and selection acts by
“weeding out” phenotypic distributions, affecting over time the frequencies in
the underlying genetic pool.
In fact, the real story is not so simple even in biology, and it is even less so
in the social domain.   For example, there might not exist a  clear one-to-one
mapping between the genes and their phenotypic manifestations affecting fitness
(for example, due to fitness-neutral genetic drifts).   Or, there might be epistatic
correlation (for an in-depth discussion, cf. Kaufmann [1993]), so that different
traits combine non-linearly to yield a particular phenotypic fitness.
                                                
19 Note incidentally that all this casts serious doubts on the monotonicity in the effects of selection forces
generally assumed in EG’s.24
Further peculiarities are specific to the socio-economic domain (see also
Dosi and Nelson [1994], Winter [1984] and [1988]).  First there is, rightly, much
more ambiguity in the identification of what the “fundamental units” are.   Good
candidates - depending on the problem at hand - are routines, technologies,
organizational forms, behavioral patterns, or even “mental models”.   Second,
technologies, behavioral patterns, etc. can be improved and modified over time
in quite “Lamarkian” fashion.   Third, “inheritance” takes diverse meanings. In
some circumstances, the biological metaphor on inter-generational transmission
is not too much off the mark. In others, inheritance should be understood mainly
as “social imitation”. Yet, in others, there is no generation-to-generation
“inheritance” but rather the indefinite perpetuation (and possibly growth over
time) of the “phenotypic” expression of the underlying traits: this is the case of
industrial evolution, where, at least in part, the frequency of particular
technologies or organizational forms grow, shrink or die together with the
organizational entities embodying them (see Winter [1990] for discussion).
Finally note that, in biology and even more so in economics, the objects
over which selection is exerted are not single elementary traits but structures of
much higher dimension in which traits are nested.   So, for example, markets
choose relatively complex products or technological systems --  not individual
elements of technological knowledge or organizational routine.  Therefore, even
after assuming some underlying space of technological and organizational traits
as the appropriate “primitive” dimension of evolution, one still needs some25
interpretation of organizational development in order to relate “evolution” and
“selection”.   Putting it another way, one needs a much better grasp of the
relationships between the “genotypic” and “phenotypic” level: we understand
this is so in biology and it is certainly a priority in economics.  This is also a
major area of complementarity between evolutionary theories on the one hand,
and business economics and experimental psychology, on the other. (See also
below).
 Here let us just mention two points.  First, studies focused on
“organizational routines” and “capabilities” begin to forge that link, building on
an ETEC perspective and exploring e.g. the way organizational knowledge is
stored and reproduced within organizations (cf. Dosi, Nelson and Winter [2000])
, the nature and origins of routines themselves (Cohen et al. [1996], among
others), etc.   Second, note also that the genotype/phenotype problem has been
largely neglected within the EGs perspective, at least so far .   In fact the
straightforward biological interpretation of an EG is as populations dynamics at
the genetic level.   Economic applications are more ambiguous, but one may
reasonably understand them as defining dynamics on some metaphorically
equivalent space of strategies (the “fundamental units of selection”).   Here
“selection”, which has - at least in principle - a clear meaning in biology as an
environmental pressure toward/against the reproduction of particular traits, is
taken to be equivalent to some payoff-driven pressure on the adaptive learning
of boundedly rational agents (as L. Samuelson puts it, “I describe the forces26
guiding agents’ strategy choice as ‘selection’ or ‘learning’.  I use these terms
interchangeably, though the former has a more biological flavor, while the latter
is commonly used in economic contexts”; (Samuelson [1997], p.22).   But in a way
the ‘learning’ interpretation is like saying that there is some set of given
strategies, and that agents ‘climb’ through them by means of some unspecified
algorithm operating internally in each agent---which however yields, at least on
the average in the population, results identical to genuine environmental
selection operating upon different pure strategy types . 20   But ultimately this
boils down to an assumption that, one way or another, the “selection landscape”
in the heads of the agents is isomorphic to the “true” selective ecology in which
the whole population lives.
By contrast, the distinction between selection and learning is highlighted
within the ETEC perspective.  Selection, to repeat has to do with what actually
happens to agents (that is at the phenotypic level) in terms of markets shares,
profitability, survival probability, etc.   Learning, on the other hand, concerns
what “goes on in their minds”.   Once one abandons the idea that the latter
accurately mirrors the former, then the obvious question is: what and how do
agents learn?
                                                
20 “The agents in biological application of evolutionary game theory never choose strategic and never
change their strategies. Instead, they are ‘hard-wired’ to play a particular strategy, which they do until they
die. Variations in the mix of strategic within a population are caused by differing rates of reproduction. In
economic applications, we have a different process in mind. The players in the game are people, who
choose and may change their strategies. An evolutionary approach in economics begins with model of this
strategy adjustment process (Samuelson [1997], p.18).27
Learning in evolutionary environments   This issue is clearly too broad to be
adequately handled in these short, notes: see Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo [1995]
for a much more extensive discussion.  The question here concerns how agents
(individuals and organizations) make sense of complex and changing
environments and how they act in them.  Different strands of ‘evolutionary’
thinking certainly have in common the hypothesis of some ‘bounds’ on agents
rationality.  Generally, this should be taken just to mean that they are less
omniscient than God (or than the local gods, the creators of the model at hand).
Beyond that, there is not much agreement on where the ‘bounds’ are and what
they imply.
Indeed, in Dosi et al. [1995], it is argued  first, that agents (including of
course ourselves) are not only characterized by information-processing and
memory limitations, but more fundamentally, by an intrinsic  competence-gap
concerning a) the representation of the environment; b) the problem-solving
repertoire; c) the detection and assessment of payoffs; and d) the very nature of
goals and preferences.  Learning affects all four domains, and their co-evolution.
Second, one is likely to obtain precious clues on such learning mechanisms
by the observation of cognitive and behavioral patterns in circumstances that are
not at all “evolutionary” -- the context is stationary and relatively simple, the
payoffs are straightforward and the action menu is trivial -- wherein agents
nevertheless display systematic biases vis-à-vis the prescriptions of “rational”
decisions making, as experiments have shown.28
More generally,  third, the evidence both on individual patterns of
cognition/decision behaviors and on regularities in organizational adjustments
and learning should be considered as fundamental disciplining criteria for the
micro-foundations of evolutionary models.
At this level, the difference among alternative perspectives is striking.  At
one extreme, ETEC models have attempted to represent agents reflecting certain
“phenomenological” regularities - e.g. on pricing, R&D investment, etc.  At the
other extreme, EG modelers – while congenial to heroic simplifying assumptions
in other respects -- have almost entirely eschewed the incorporation of stylized
reflections of empirical considerations reported from experimental economic and
cognitive sciences.  Indeed, Camerer’s remark that “when game theory does aim
to describe behavior, it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful
observation to theorizing” (Camerer [1997] p. 167) applies equally to its EG
version.  As a case in point, compare Fudemberg and Levine [1998] and
Samuelson [1997], on the one hand, with the experimental evidence discussed in
Camerer [1995] and [1997], on the other.  And even more striking is the contrast
between what modelers of industrial organization theorize (or prescribe?) and
the evidence on actual corporate behaviors.21
As an illustration, consider the suggestive examples of interactions
involving a strategic dimension presented in  the pathbreaking work of Schelling
                                                
21 For some insightful remarks cf. the reviews by Loasby [1995] and Metcalfe [1995] of Milgrom and
Roberts [1992].29
[1978].  Certainly, the environments defining most of these “games” are  not
evolutionary in any specific sense: there is no dynamics in the “fundamentals;”
the menu of actions is fixed, given from the start and fairly understandable to the
agents; there is no replicator dynamics.  If there is an evolutionary part to them,
it is in the way people come to understand such environments and develop their
action repertoires.  Since Schelling’s contribution, what have we learned in terms
of  descriptive theories?  (Agreed, we have learned a lot about the logic of
structure and incentive of the interactions by re-stating them in formal game-
theoretic terms.)  What  descriptive gains derive from postulating some variety of
dynamics in the EG style?  In fact, those dynamics point toward an implicit
theory of adaptive learning.  Whether it is a sound descriptive theory is
indicated, presumably, by the empirical check from the behavioral and cognitive
disciplines.  For example, do people actually learn via mechanisms that entail the
self-seeking reinforcements postulated by most EGs?  Roughly speaking, the
experimental answer seems to be negative.  Rather, as is argued at greater length
in Dosi et al. [1995], a more promising avenue of research appears to be an
explicit account of the nature and dynamics of mental models and interpretative
categories through which agents make sense of the environment they are facing
and adjust to it. A fortiori, we suggest, this applies to evolutionary environments
with the characteristics described earlier. But all that, in turn, demands
descriptive theories of economic behaviors resting on empirically disciplined
“nanofoundations”, taking on board the evidence from  the growing literature on30
the dynamics of cognition,“reasoning,” “sentiments,” etc., – on the individual
level – and organizational behaviors – at collective levels.
5. Conclusion
In sum, there are multiple dimensions over which the different
perspectives invoking  evolutionary arguments may be evaluated.
A first one is the the degree of “rational,” forward-looking understanding
of their decision environments that agents are assumed to possess, as compared
to the objective complexity of their cognitive and problem-solving tasks.
A second relates to the nature of the evolutionary environments analyzed,
and in particular whether the focus is upon “small-world” set-ups versus an
“open-ended” dynamics allowing for various forms of endogenously generated
novelty.
Third, at a methodological level, a crucial issue concerns the degree of
phenomenological discipline to which models subscribe in such significant
respects as agents’ cognitive abilities, learning mechanisms, behavioral rules,
interaction format, etc.
And, finally, there is the question of what the various models are meant to
interpret, and what testing criteria they set for themselves.
It is clear from this brief assessment of the state of the art that wide
differences persist across all these dimensions.   The hopeful message is that, at
the least, all the reviewed perspectives subscribe to the “dynamics first”31
commitments discussed above: interpreting change means telling, in one way or
another, a process story rather than a “rationalization” of how what exist may
coherently be accounted for.   But this is certainly not enough to yield a
consistent evolutionary interpretation of economic dynamics.  The challenge
ahead, as we see it, involves a painstaking reassessment of the microfoundations
characterizing what agents do, how they learn, their interactions and the ways all
that is embedded into institutional structures and “habits of thought” that shape
the possible worlds achievable at any point in time.  Certainly, for economists,
that reassessment requires more attention to the wealth of evidence from other
disciplines, from psychology to political science.   The upside of such inquiry
might be that the descriptive analysis of observed courses of individual and
collective behavior is freed (at last) from the conceptual prison of a deductive,
prescriptive theory of action.32
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